The capacity for imagery, enabling us to visualise absent items and events, is a ubiquitous feature of our experience. This paper describes the case of a patient, MX, who abruptly lost the ability to generate visual images. He rated himself as experiencing almost no imagery on standard questionnaires, yet performed normally on standard tests of perception, visual imagery and visual memory. These unexpected findings were explored using functional MRI scanning (fMRI). Activation patterns while viewing famous faces were not significantly different between MX and controls, including expected activity in the fusiform gyrus. However, during attempted imagery, activation in MX's brain was significantly reduced in a network of posterior regions while activity in frontal regions was increased compared to controls. These findings are interpreted as suggesting that MX adopted a different cognitive strategy from controls when performing the imagery task. Evidence from experimental tasks thought to rely on mental imagery, such as the Brooks' matrices and mental rotation, support this interpretation. Taken together, these results indicate that successful performance in visual imagery and visual memory tasks can be dissociated from the phenomenal experience of visual imagery.
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Introduction
Asked to imagine a familiar item or recall a recent event, most people can call to mind an image that is less vivid than the original but has a visual 'feel'. This expresses our capacity to experience visual mental imagery. There is a long-standing debate (see review in Bartolomeo, 2008) as to whether this mental experience plays a functional role in cognition: one view suggests that propositional knowledge is sufficient for supporting performance in imagery tasks (e.g. Pylyshyn, 2002) , the other that imagery plays a key functional role (Kosslyn, Thomson & Ganis, 2006; Paivio, 1971) . It could be that a range of cognitive strategies might be available to participants in these tasks. For example, imagery tasks might be performed using imagery or by using a propositional strategy. Both strategies might be available to healthy adults, although there is a wide variation in the extent to which people report the experience of visual imagery (e.g. Marks, 1973; McKelvie, 1995; Reisberg, Kosslyn & Pearson, 2003) . Some subjects may, in other words, have a capacity for 'blind imagination', successful use of an alternative strategy to perform imagery tasks in the absence of the experience of imagery. This can be thought as analogous to the phenomenon of 'blindsight', characterized by successful performance in visuomotor tasks in the absence of visual perceptual experience.
We describe the case of an individual (MX) who reported the sudden loss of the experience of visual imagery in the absence of any other cognitive deficits. In previous published studies, the loss of visual imagery has been accompanied by impairments in performance on imagery tasks, for example in patients who show severe impairments on imagery tests but have intact perception (e.g. Farah, 1984; Bartolomeo, 2002; Kaski, 2002; Moro, Berlucchi, Lerch, Tomaiuolo & Aglioti, 2008) and in patients who show pure representational neglect but no perceptual neglect (Guariglia, Padovani, Pantano & Pizzamiglio, 1993; Beschin, Cocchini, Della Sala & Logie, 1997) . In striking contrast, despite giving a persuasive description of his mental imagery deficit, MX was unimpaired on a range of standard tests of visual imagery. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the basis for the apparent dissociation between the
